A two Sided Reputation Result with Long Run Players

Cripps et al. (2005) conjectured that in an infinitely repeated game with two equally patient players, if there is positive probability that the players could be Stackelberg types, then equilibrium behavior would resemble a war of attrition, i.e., a two-sided reputation result would hold. In this note we show that this conjecture is indeed true for a wide set of stage games for which the one-sided reputation result of Atakan and Ekmekci (2008) holds..

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Year of publication:	2009-08
Authors:	Ekmekci, Mehmet ; Atakan, Alp
Institutions:	Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management
Subject:	Repeated Games \| Reputation \| Equal Discount Factor \| Long-run Players \| War of Attrition

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804921