A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
René Kirkegaard
| Year of publication: |
January 2017
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Kirkegaard, René |
| Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 12.2017, 1, p. 25-51
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| Subject: | First-order approach | moral hazard | multi-tasking | orthant orders | principal-agent models | stochastic orders | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE2008 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011645944