Abuse of power: An experimental investigation of the effects of power and transparency on centralized punishment

We investigate power abuse of a single punisher in a public-goods-game subject to variations in punishment power and contribution transparency. We find a high amount of abuse across all conditions. More power led to more abuse over time, while transparency could only curb abuse in the high power conditions. These findings highlight the dangers of power centralization, but suggest a more complex relation of power and transparency

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Hoeft, Leonard ; Mill, Wladislaw
Publisher:	Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Subject:	punishment \| public-goods-game \| designated punishment \| abuse \| transparency \| power

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Series:	Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2017/15
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	896027953 [GVK] hdl:10419/174494 [Handle] RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2017_15 [RePEc]
Classification:	H41 - Public Goods ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011789565