Accounting performance goals in CEO compensation contracts and corporate risk taking
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Chen, Xiaoling ; Kim, Minjeong ; Li, Laura Yue ; Zhu, Wei |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5501, ZDB-ID 2023019-9. - Vol. 68.2022, 8, p. 6039-6058
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Subject: | executive compensation | performance goals | risk taking | target setting | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Betriebswirtschaftliches Ziel | Corporate objective | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Risikomanagement | Risk management | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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