Active Agents, Passive Principals: Does High-Powered CEO Compensation Really Improve Incentives
Year of publication: |
2002-04
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Authors: | Dow, James ; Raposo, Clara |
Institutions: | C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers |
Subject: | agency theory | executive compensation | free-cash-flow theory | strategic complexity |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 3309 |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods |
Source: |
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Dow, James, (2000)
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The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts
Lund, Andrew, (2014)
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Goodwill Impairment Losses and CEO Compensation
Darrough, Masako N., (2019)
- More ...
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Effective leadership and the pressure for decisive action
Dow, James, (2003)
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Active agents, passive principals : does high-powered CEO compensation really improve incentives?
Dow, James, (2002)
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Raposo, Clara, (2000)
- More ...