Adverse selection and moral hazards reduction in corporate financing : a mechanism design model for PLS contracts
Adil Elfakir and Mohamed Tkiouat
| Year of publication: |
2019
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | El Fakir, Adil ; Tkiouat, Mohamed |
| Published in: |
Annals of economics and finance. - Beijing : Peking University Press, ISSN 1529-7373, ZDB-ID 2097904-6. - Vol. 20.2019, 1, p. 163-179
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| Subject: | Sharing ratio | Adverse selection | Assymetric information | Moralhazards | Moral hazard premium (MHP) | PLS contracts | Adverse Selektion | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012110481