Advertised meeting-the-competition clauses: Collusion instead of price discrimination

Pricing strategies may include the advertising of meeting-the-competition clauses (MCCs). We show in a specific spatial model scenario with differently informed consumers that MCCs primarily serve as a device to facilitate collusion instead of allowing for price discrimination between these consumers.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Budzinski, Oliver ; Kretschmer, Jürgen-Peter
Publisher:	Esbjerg : University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics (IME)
Subject:	Betriebliche Preispolitik \| Werbung \| Preisdifferenzierung \| Kartellrecht \| Theorie \| meeting-the-competition clauses \| advertising \| price discrimination \| competition \| collusion

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Series:	IME Working Paper ; 99
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	624792366 [GVK] hdl:10419/82809 [Handle]
Classification:	M21 - Business Economics ; M37 - Advertising ; L40 - Antitrust Policy. General ; L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms ; D21 - Firm Behavior
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321690