Aggregating quasi-transitive preferences: a note

To examine the consequences of allowing individual to violate full rationality in collective decision making, this article discusses the possibility of aggregating quasi-transitive preferences in the Arrovian framework. Quasi-transitive valued aggregating functions are discussed and characterised. A characterisation of the weak Pareto extension rule is also achieved as a corollary.

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Year of publication:	2014-05-08
Authors:	Qin, Dan
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 34.2014, 2, p. 976-983
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	preference aggregation \| quasi-transitivity \| veto power \| Weak Pareto extension rule

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010835771