Algorithmic Characterization of Rationalizability in Extensive Form Games

We construct a dynamic epistemic model for extensive form games, which generates a hierarchy of beliefs for each player over her opponents` strategies and beliefs, and tells us how those beliefs will be revised as the game proceeds. We use the model to analyze the implications of the assumption that the players possess common (true) belief in rationality, thus extending the concept of rationalizability to extensive form games.

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Year of publication:	2003-03-01
Authors:	Board, Oliver
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Oxford University
Subject:	rationalizability \| extensive form games \| belief revision

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Series Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 148
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051126