Aligning Financial Supervisory Structures with Country Needs.

Intro -- Contents -- Foreword -- Contributors -- Chapter 1: Summary of the Discussion -- Choosing an Appropriate Regulatory Structure -- Managing the Transition -- Making Structures Work -- Other Issues -- Conclusions -- Chapter 2: Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues -- Institutional Structure -- Some Initial Perspectives -- Regulation, the Financial System, and the Economy -- Universal Functions -- Origin of the Debate -- Some Key Issues -- The Importance of Institutional Structure -- A Regulatory Matrix -- Alternative Frameworks -- Integrated Versus Multiple Agencies: -- The Case for Integration -- The Potential Hazards of Integrated Agencies -- The Mega Regulator-Supervisor -- Twin Peaks Model -- The Role of the Central Bank -- International Experience -- Corporate Governance Issues -- Conclusions -- Appendix. Financial Conglomerates -- Chapter 3: Making the Structural Decision -- Australia's Approach to Regulatory Reform -- Setting Up the Inquiry -- The Evidence Produced by the Inquiry -- Inefficiencies in the Financial System -- The Changing Financial Landscape -- Regulatory Implications -- From Implications to Objectives -- Philosophical Framework -- Anticompetitive Behavior -- Market Misconduct -- Asymmetric Information -- Systemic Instability -- Implications for Regulatory Structure -- Structural Options Considered -- Industry-Based Regulators -- The Market Failure-based Model -- The Super Regulator Model -- The Committee Recommendations -- Conclusions -- The South African Case -- South Africa's Financial Environment -- The Process to Review the Regulatory Environment -- A Mild Bank Liquidity Crisis -- Country-Specific Features Informing the Structural Decision -- Openness of the Economy and the Discretion of the Central Bank -- Concentration in Banking -- Settlement System and Time to React.