All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is, in general, more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.

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Year of publication:	2023
Authors:	Arribillaga, R. Pablo ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 18.2023, 3, p. 1023-1061
Subject:	division problems \| Obvious strategy-proofness \| sequential allotment rules \| single-peaked preferences \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE5111 [DOI] hdl:10419/296433 [Handle]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014325261