Allocation by coercion

The problem of allocating indivisible goods is considered when groups of individuals can make use of their power to plunder other groups. A monarch in a group of individuals is an individual who always obtains one of his most preferred goods. A Paretian condition together with a requirement of robust stability lead to the existence of monarchs in all subsets of individuals, except possibly one.

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Year of publication:	2009-11-30
Authors:	Quesada, Antonio

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Quesada, Antonio (2009): Allocation by coercion.
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D85 - Network Formation
Source:	BASE

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