Alternatives to plurality rule for single-winner elections : when do they make a difference?
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lachat, Romain ; Laslier, Jean-François |
Published in: |
European journal of political economy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1873-5703, ZDB-ID 1491120-6. - Vol. 81.2024, Art.-No. 102505, p. 1-13
|
Subject: | Condorcet efficiency | Condorcet winner | Electoral systems | Party system fragmentation | Polarization | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Theorie | Theory | Wahlsystem | Electoral system | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Politische Partei | Political party | Parteiensystem | Party system | Wahl | Election |
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