Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a Public Good game

This paper analyzes an evolutionary version of the Public Good game in which boundedly rational agents can use imitation and best-reply decision rules. Several possibilities for both decision rules to be present in the population are considered. I show that altruistic behavior might survive if switching between the decision rules occurs less often than the probabilities of errors in choosing a strategy and if local neighborhoods are not too small or too large.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Matros, Alexander
Published in:	Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1889. - Vol. 36.2012, 4, p. 642-656
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Public good \| Imitation \| Best reply \| Decision rules

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010871060