Ambiguous contracts
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz, Larry Samuelson
| Year of publication: |
2024
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Dütting, Paul ; Feldman, Michal ; Peretz, Daniel ; Samuelson, Larry |
| Subject: | ambiguity aversion | Ambiguous contract | contract design | hidden action | moral hazard | principal-agent model | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract |
freely available
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.3982/ECTA22687 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015117872