Ambiguous contracts

Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz, Larry Samuelson

Year of publication:	2024
Authors:	Dütting, Paul ; Feldman, Michal ; Peretz, Daniel ; Samuelson, Larry
Published in:	Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1468-0262, ZDB-ID 1477253-X. - Vol. 92.2024, 6, p. 1967-1992
Subject:	ambiguity aversion \| Ambiguous contract \| contract design \| hidden action \| moral hazard \| principal-agent model \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Risikoaversion \| Risk aversion \| Vertrag \| Contract \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit \| Decision under uncertainty \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Unvollständiger Vertrag \| Incomplete contract

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/ECTA22687 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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