An application of principal agent theory to contractual hiring arrangements within public sector organizations
Charlene M.L. Roach (The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus, St. Augustine, Trinidad & Tobago)
| Year of publication: |
February 2016
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Roach, Charlene M. L. |
| Published in: |
Theoretical economics letters. - Irvine, Calif. : Scientific Research, ISSN 2162-2078, ZDB-ID 2657454-8. - Vol. 6.2016, 1, p. 28-33
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| Subject: | Principal-Agent Theory | Agency Problems | Moral Hazard | Asymmetric Information | Adverse Selection | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Moral hazard | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Öffentlicher Sektor | Public sector | Personalbeschaffung | Recruitment |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.4236/tel.2016.61004 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544571