AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION.
Year of publication: |
1989
|
---|---|
Authors: | FUDENBERG, D. ; LEVINE, D.K. |
Institutions: | Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) |
Subject: | information | game theory | economic equilibrium |
-
Unrestricted Bargaining Under One-sided Asymmetric Information.
Nosal, E., (1990)
-
Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games.
Jordan, J.S., (1990)
-
Convergence to Rational Expectations in a Stationary Linear Game.
Jordan, J.S., (1990)
- More ...
-
Fudenberg, D., (1991)
-
Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players.
Fudenberg, D., (1991)
-
MONOPOLY AND CREDIBILITY IN ASSET MARKETS: AN EXAMPLE.
FUDENBERG, D., (1989)
- More ...