An assessment of stability and growth pact reform proposals in a small-scale macro framework

This paper contributes to the debate on fiscal governance for the European Monetary Union, assessing the different fiscal rules currently discussed. We simulate a small scale macroeconomic model with forward looking agents, augmented with a public finances block. We account for both the positive (output stabilization) and negative (via risk premia) effects of debt and deficit. By the appropriate choice of the exogenous fiscal variables, in the fiscal block, we replicate the working of the rules embedded in the socalled “fiscal compact”: a balanced budget rule (the “new golden rule”), and the debt reduction rule (to reach 60% of GDP in 20 years). We compare these rules with the Maastricht 3% deficit limit (status quo), and with an “investment” rule leaving room for public investment. We evaluate the performance in terms of output loss during a fiscal consolidation, as well as following demand and supply shocks in steady state. All rules guarantee long run sustainability. The investment rule emerges robustly as the one guaranteeing the lower output loss, followed by the status quo. The “fiscal compact” rules appear to be recessionary.