An Economic Rationale for Dismissing Low-Quality Experts in Trial
Year of publication: |
2016
|
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Authors: | Kim, Chulyoung |
Publisher: |
[2016]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Experten | Experts | Entscheidung | Decision | Rechtsordnung | Legal system | Verfahrensrecht | Procedural law | Qualität | Quality |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (22 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 2015 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.2760822 [DOI] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; K41 - Litigation Process |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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