An efficient dynamic mechanism
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Athey, Susan ; Segal, Ilya |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 81.2013, 6, p. 2463-2485
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Subject: | Dynamic mechanism design | dynamic incentive compatibility | perfect Bayesian equilibrium | budget balance | Markov games with private information | folk theorems with private | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Markov-Kette | Markov chain | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Dynamische Wirtschaftstheorie | Economic dynamics |
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