An empirical examination of the location and timing of non-renewals in a farmland differential assessment program

We study the non-renewals of contracts in the farmland differential assessment program of California. An instrumental variable random-effect model for the location of non-renewals and a hazard model for the timing of non-renewals indicate that counties with high property tax rates have 0.8% lower odds of a non-renewal, transition slower to a rapid state of non-renewals by 4%, and transition faster to the slow state by 6%. This suggests differential assessment programs provide benefits to tax payers by preserving agricultural land and reducing how quickly development pressure causes non-renewals, and ultimately development, in farm communities. Counties at higher elevations transition faster to a rapid state of non-renewals by 4% and transition slower to the slow state by 2%. This suggests there should be more attention to development pressure at higher elevations, where regulations are weaker and amenities are greater. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013