An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear

In a single item auction model that allows non-quasilinear preferences, we show that an auction rule satisfies weak envy-freeness for equals, strategy-proofness, and nonimposition if and only if it is a (generalized) second price auction. This characterization is established on a wide class of preference domains, including the quasilinear domain, a positive income effect domain, and a negative income effect domain. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Sakai, Toyotaka
Published in:	Review of Economic Design. - Springer. - Vol. 17.2013, 1, p. 17-26
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Non-quasilinear preference \| Second price auction \| Strategy-proofness \| Equal treatment of equals \| Fair allocation

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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