An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sakai, Toyotaka |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Design. - Springer. - Vol. 17.2013, 1, p. 17-26
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Non-quasilinear preference | Second price auction | Strategy-proofness | Equal treatment of equals | Fair allocation |
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