An Experiment : Voluntary Separation in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game

In economic and social relationships, such as employment and marriages, participants often have the option to separate from their partner. This study experimentally investigates how the option to separate with or without a cost affects cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. For costly separation, I consider the cost of establishing a new match as well as the opportunity cost of missed interactions due to delays in matching. The theoretical model assumes the coexistence of non-strategic defectors and strategic conditional cooperators and predicts the long-run cooperation rate to which the population converges as players learn the initially unknown type distribution through experience. The experimental data support the theoretical prediction that compared to no separation, costless separation lowers the cooperation rate in the long run. The low cooperation rate and positive assortment through separation from defectors result in greater equity within matches. Costly separation increases the cooperation rate compared to no separation, yet the higher cooperation rate improves efficiency only under the high continuation probability