An experimental analysis of the Ultimatum Game : the role of competing motivations

Loránd Ambrus-Lakatos, Tamás Meszerics

This paper forwards a new way of accounting for the experimental evidence related to the Ultimatum Game. We argue that players in this game have reasons to be both fair and self-interested, but the balance between these two considerations cannot be expressed in terms of a tradeoff. We test our thesis by perturbing the Ultimatum Game in a way that emphasizes the force of self-interest considerations; the evidence we collected provides support for our thesis.

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Year of publication:	November 2001
Authors:	Ambrus-Lakatos, Loránd ; Meszerics, Tamás
Publisher:	Budapest : Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Subject:	Experiment \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Ultimatumspiel \| Ultimatum game \| Motivation

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten)
Series:	Mu̐helytanulmányok / Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Közgazdaságtudományi Kutatóközpont. - Budapest : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2276847-6. - Vol. MT-DP. 2001, 9
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Zusammenfassung in ungarischer Sprache
ISBN:	963-9321-36-2
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/108027 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011545653