An Experimental Analysis of the Ultimatum Game: The Role of Competing Motivations

This paper forwards a new way of accounting for the experimental evidence related to the Ultimatum Game. We argue that players in this game have reasons to be both fair and self-interested, but the balance between these two considerations cannot be expressed in terms of a tradeoff. We test our thesis by perturbing the Ultimatum Game in a way that emphasizes the force of self-interest considerations; the evidence we collected provides support for our thesis.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Ambrus-Lakatos, Lorand ; Meszerics, Tamas
Publisher:	Budapest : Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics

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Series:	IEHAS Discussion Papers ; MT-DP - 2001/9
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	870237403 [GVK] hdl:10419/108027 [Handle] RePEc:has:discpr:0109 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494273