An experimental investigation of optimal learning in coordination games

This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee for it to be used. Optimal learning can be impeded by both irrelevant information and the complexity of the coordination task.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Blume, Andreas ; Gneezy, Uri
Publisher:	Berlin : Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

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Series:	WZB Discussion Paper ; FS IV 98-12
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/52597 [Handle]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010278953