AN EXTENSION OF THE TEVELATION PRINCIPLE.
Year of publication: |
1988
|
---|---|
Authors: | BURGUET, R. |
Institutions: | Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
Subject: | information | game theory | economic models |
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