An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
Year of publication: |
March 2017
|
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Authors: | Peters, Hans J. M. ; Roy, Souvik ; Sadhukhan, Soumyarup ; Storcken, Ton |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 69.2017, p. 84-90
|
Subject: | Strategy-proofness | Probabilistic rules | Binary restricted domains | Single-dipped domains | Theorie | Theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule |
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