An impure public good model with lotteries in large grou

We analyze the efect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary contributions, even though in general they do not yield First-best levels.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Cabrales, Antonio ; Lugo, Haydée
Institutions:	Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Subject:	Lotteries \| Public good \| Warm glow \| Eficiency

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 2011-05 14 pages
Classification:	D64 - Altruism ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008864017