An Incentive Contract With Asymmetric Information

This Paper considers the problem of designing an optimal incentive contract between a retailer and a manufacturer when the former has private information about demand and its own cost. Based on a multi-period framework, we show that the incentive franchise contract can bring about the fist-best outcome of vertical integration when the retailer has complete information about consumers' preferences. [L42, D8]

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Choong-Young, Jung ; Jae-Cheol, Kim ; Sang-Ho, Lee
Published in:	International Economic Journal. - Taylor & Francis Journals, ISSN 1016-8737. - Vol. 14.2000, 1, p. 99-110
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis Journals

More details

Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005644287