An Incentive Theory of Matching

We construct a theoretical model explaining two-sided selection through microeconomic incentives. Firms face adjustment costs in responding to heterogeneous variations in the characteristics of workers and jobs. Matches and separations are described through firms' job offer and firing decisions and workers' job acceptance and quit decisions. Our calibrated model for the U.S. can account for important empirical regularities that the conventional matching model cannot.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Snower, Dennis ; Merkl, Christian ; Brown, Alessio J. G.
Institutions:	Society for Economic Dynamics - SED

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	2010 Meeting Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series 2010 SED Meeting Papers Number 439
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011080668