An individual manipulability of positional voting rules

We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Aleskerov, Fuad ; Karabekyan, Daniel ; Sanver, M. Remzi ; Yakuba, Vyacheslav
Published in:	SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association. - Heidelberg : Springer, ISSN 1869-4195. - Vol. 2.2011, 4, p. 431-446
Publisher:	Heidelberg : Springer
Subject:	Abstimmungsregel \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Theorie \| manipulability \| positional voting rules \| multiple choice \| extended preferences

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1007/s13209-011-0050-y [DOI] 68806826X [GVK] hdl:10419/77764 [Handle]
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317105