An information paradox with HARA preferences

Jack Wahl

The incentive to trade implies that all investors in the market choose to be informed although the whole of them cannot profit from the information signal. This result is due to an insurance property of information.

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Year of publication:	1988
Authors:	Wahl, Jack E.
Publisher:	Konstanz : Univ.
Subject:	Finanzmarkt \| Financial market \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Theorie \| Theory \| Marktinformation \| Modell \| Hyperbelic Absolute Risk Aversion Model

Extent:	12 gez. Bl.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/75102 [Handle]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009500005