An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Berga Colom, Dolors ; Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro |
Published in: |
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : NH, Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896, ZDB-ID 283230-6. - Vol. 54.2007, 2, p. 152-175
|
Subject: | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Gruppenentscheidung | Group decision-making | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium |
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