An Analysis of the Effects on Parties' Unionization Decisions of the Choice of Union Representation Procedure : The Strategic Dynamic Certification Model

This article proposes a new theoretical framework - the strategic dynamic certification model - to explain how union certification processes operate. Statutory certification procedures are not neutral. Instead, they produce particular incentives, disincentives, and opportunities for employers, unions, and employees, and these affect the outcomes of the procedure. Empirical evidence confirms this model's ability to analyze the certification process and the outcomes of unionization attempts. In particular, this model explains why the change from a card-check to a mandatory representation vote encourages unlawful employer conduct, enhances the effectiveness of union avoidance activities, and deters employee participation in the unionization decision. The article concludes that, in order to accommodate a mandatory vote procedure within the existing labour relations framework, it is necessary to counteract employer unfair labour practices during union organizing through modifications to the certification procedure. Finally, the strategic dynamic certification model is applied to develop specific proposals for legislative reform aimed at reducing the negative effects of the mandatory vote procedure, thereby enhancing the validity and credibility of the certification process and of the labour relations system