Analytical foundations of physical security system assessment

Physical security systems are intended to prevent or mitigate potentially catastrophicloss of property or life. Decisions regarding the selection of one system orconfiguration of resources over another may be viewed as design decisions within arisk theoretic setting. The problem of revealing a clear preference among design alternatives,using only a partial or inexact delineation of event probabilities, is examined.In this dissertation, an analytical framework for the assessment of the risk associatedwith a physical security system is presented. Linear programming is usedto determine bounds on the expected utility of an alternative, and conditions forthe separation of preferences among alternatives are shown. If distinguishable preferencesdo not exist, techniques to determine what information may help to separatepreferences are presented. The linear programming approach leads to identificationof vulnerabilities in a security system through an examination of the solution to thedual problem.Security of a hypothetical military forward operating base is considered as anillustrative example. For two alternative security schemes, the uncertainty inherent inthe scenario is represented using probability assessments consisting of bounds on eventprobabilities and exact probability assignments. Application of the framework revealsno separation of preferences between the alternatives. Examination of the primal and dual solutions to the linear programming problems, however, reveals insights intoinformation which, if obtained, could lead to a separation of preferences as well asinformation on vulnerabilities in one of the alternative security postures.