Announcement wars as an equilibrium selection device

This paper attempts to give a rationale to public announcements, so often observed in the real world, and to formalize the idea that they can be used as a form of equilibrium selection device when multiple equilibria arise. It also shows how announcements solve the problems of coordination failures as predicted by the empirical literature based on experimental studies

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Year of publication:	2009-12-01
Authors:	ACOCELLA, Nicola ; DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni ; HUGHES HALLETT, Andrew ; PIACQUADIO, Paolo G.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	multiple Nash equilibria \| coordination failure \| cheap talk \| policy games \| announcement equilibrium

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CORE Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 2009077
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550186