Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems
We introduce the notion of a quota pair system and show that any social choice procedure, where there are exactly two alternatives and a fixed number of voters, satisfies anonymity and monotonicity if and only if it is uniquely determined by a quota pair system.
Year of publication: |
2010
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---|---|
Authors: | Perry, Jonathan ; Powers, Robert C. |
Published in: |
Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 60.2010, 1, p. 57-60
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Anonymity Monotonicity Simple majority rule Abstention |
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