Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain

The Condorcet rule on the domain of profiles at which there exists a unique Condorcet winner is the unique rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Campbell, Donald E. ; Kelly, Jerry S.
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 128.2015, C, p. 79-82
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Social choice rules \| Condorcet \| Anonymity \| Neutrality \| Strategy-proofness

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011208444