Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain
Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly
| Year of publication: |
2015
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Campbell, Donald E. ; Kelly, Jerry S. |
| Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 128.2015, p. 79-82
|
| Subject: | Social choice rules | Condorcet | Anonymity | Neutrality | Strategy-proofness | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383021