Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Basile, Achille ; Rao, Surekha ; Bhaskara Rao, K. P. S. |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 133.2022, p. 138-149
|
Subject: | Anonymity | Non-manipulability | Quota majority | Social choice functions | Veto | Weak preferences | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule |
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