Another experimental look at reciprocal behavior: indirect reciprocity

This paper highlights a new social motivation, the indirect reciprocity, through a three-player dictator-ultimatum game. Player 2 has the opportunity to reward or punish indirectly the player 1 by inciting – with her offer - player 3 to accept or to reject the division. We implement three treatments: in the first two we vary player 2’s available information whereas in treatment 3, players take part in a dictator game - as proposers - before being player 2s in the dictator-ultimatum game. Results show that 55% of subjects in treatment 2 and 28% in treatment 3 behave as indirect reciprocity predicts. Another reciprocal behavior - the generalized reciprocity - is investigated through a three-player dictator game. Our data show that 80% of players 2 act according to this reciprocal behavior. Finally, our findings confirm that the more complex the strategic interaction becomes the more self-regarding behavior is likely and the less other-regarding behaviors, such as reciprocity, dominate.