Another strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
Robert C. Powers, Flannery Wells
| Year of publication: |
2023
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Powers, Robert C. ; Wells, Flannery |
| Published in: |
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : NH, Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896, ZDB-ID 283230-6. - Vol. 122.2023, p. 42-49
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| Subject: | Condorcet domain | Majority rule | Neutrality | Strategy-proof | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Theorie | Theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.02.001 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014312353