Anticipating bailouts: the incentive-conflict model and the collapse of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund

An examination of the effect of the collapse of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund on insured financial institutions in the context of the incentive-conflict model developed by Edward Kane, finding that differences in abnormal returns of FDIC and FSLIC firms tend to reaffirm that taxpayer-funded bailouts are a natural outgrowth of the moral-hazard problem that taxpayers face.

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Year of publication:	1994
Authors:	DeGennaro, Ramon P. ; Thomson, James B.
Institutions:	Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Subject:	Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund \| Bank stocks

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 9407
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005428423