Anticipating disagreement in dynamic contracting
| Year of publication: |
2022
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Zhu, John Y. |
| Published in: |
Review of finance : journal of the European Finance Association. - Oxford : Oxford University Press, ISSN 1875-824X, ZDB-ID 2214390-7. - Vol. 26.2022, 5, p. 1241-1265
|
| Subject: | Disagreement | Uncertainty | Ambiguity | Robustness | Debt | Overconfidence | Overinvestment | Refinance | Renegotiation | Equity premium | Debt-to-equity ratio | Security design | Financial contracting | Optimal contracting | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract | Kapitalstruktur | Capital structure | Risiko | Risk | Risikoprämie | Risk premium | Unternehmensfinanzierung | Corporate finance | Anlageverhalten | Behavioural finance | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | CAPM |
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