Antidumping Constraints and Trade Elimination
This article investigates the international duopoly equilibrium when two countries impose antidumping constraints. It shows that, depending on the parameters of the model, three Nash equilibria exist: one in which both firms trade, one in which no firm trades and one in which a single firm trades.
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | Cerný, Aleš ; Schmitt, Nicolas |
Published in: |
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES). - Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik / Société Suisse d"Économie et de Statistique - SGVS/SSES, ISSN 0303-9692. - Vol. 131.1995, III, p. 441-452
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Publisher: |
Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik / Société Suisse d"Économie et de Statistique - SGVS/SSES |
Saved in:
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