Appointed learning for the common good : optimal committee size and monetary transfers
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gersbach, Hans ; Mamageishvili, Akaki ; Tejada, Oriol |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 136.2022, p. 153-176
|
Subject: | Committee | Incomplete social contracts | Information acquisition | Majority rule | Monetary transfers | Voting | Theorie | Theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
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