Approximately optimal mechanism design
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Roughgarden, Tim ; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal |
Published in: |
Annual review of economics. - Palo Alto, Calif. : Annual Reviews, ISSN 1941-1383, ZDB-ID 2525440-6. - Vol. 11.2019, p. 355-381
|
Subject: | algorithmic game theory | auction theory | social welfare | revenue maximization | complexity | simplicity | detail dependence | multiparameter settings | computational complexity | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Mathematische Optimierung | Mathematical programming | Algorithmus | Algorithm |
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