Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
Year of publication: |
May 2017
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Authors: | Li, Yunan |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 103.2017, p. 225-253
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Subject: | Mechanism design | Approximation | Interdependent values | Revenue maximization | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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